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Abstract
Since 2013 “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR, also “Belt and Road 
Initiative”) has been one of the most commonly used terms in 
public discourse regarding Chinese foreign policy. This show 
the importance of the initiative to the Chinese leaders, particu-
lar president Xi Jinping. The enterprise consists of two parts: 
The Silk Road Economic Belt and The 21st-century Maritime Silk 
Road. The article aims to consider the future development of 
the project. The analysis of Chinese documents, statements of 
political leaders, and expansion of the project from 2013 to mid-
2017 was employed in order to assess possible outcomes of the 
policy. The results of the study lead to three conclusions. Firstly, 
OBOR is becoming an umbrella term for different regional de-
velopment strategies across Eurasia, Africa and perhaps beyond. 
Those strategies include many aspects, ranging from economy, 
through security, science to environmental protection. Secondly, 
OBOR became the cognitive framework, a paradigm, for inter-
national relations – the way that people perceive them. Thirdly, 
the introduction of the initiative may be the beginning of China 
in the role of architect of new global institutions and rules. How-
ever, the rapid expansion of OBOR, both in term of quantity of 
participants as well as various aspects of cooperation, may lead 
to ineffectiveness of the initiative.
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Since 2013 “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR)1 has been one of 
the most commonly used terms in public discourse regard-
ing Chinese foreign policy. The initiative, presented by presi-
dent Xi Jinping, consists of two parts: The Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt and The 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. The 
Belt spans from China via Central Asia, Russia, Central Eu-
rope to Western Europe. The maritime road starts in China, 
goes through South China Sea, Indian Ocean and Suez Ca-
nal to Europe. Many scholars hold the view that this is just 
Chinese response to internal economic problems combined 
with possible solution to security problems.2 From the eco-
nomic point of view, China seems to simply boost its export. 
At first glance, Beijing’s initiative indeed aims to strengthen 
existing trade routes and to establish new ones towards Eu-
rope in order to promote export of manufactured products. 
Simeon Djankov goes even further and add to that another 
1 „One Belt, One Road” is recently often presented by Chinese gov-
ernment and media as “Belt and Road Initiative”. In this article, the first 
form will be used.
2 Theresa Fallon, “The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strat-
egy for Eurasia”, American Foreign Policy Interests 37, no. 3 (2015): 
153, doi:10.1080/10803920.2015.1056682; Antonina Habova, “Silk Road 
Economic Belt: China’s Marshall Plan, Pivot to Eurasia or China’s Way 
of Foreign Policy”, KSI Trasactions on Knowledge Society VIII, no. 1 
(2015): 66; Arnaldo M. A. Gonçalves, “China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initia-
tive. Just Economics?”, Pyrex Journal of Political Science and Interna-
tional Relations 3, no. 2 (2017): 27; Georgi Georgiev, “The Chinese ‘One 
Belt, One Road’ Initiative – New Opportunities for the European Union 
and Its Neighbours in the Black Sea Region,” KSI Trasactions on Knowl-
edge Society VIII, no. 2 (2015): 34; Andrzej Bujak and Zdzisław Śliwa, 
“Global Aspects of Security Environment — the ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
Project,” Ecomomics and Law 15, no. 4 (2016): 449–50, doi:10.12775/
EiP.2016.029; Yong Wang, “Offensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road 
Initiative and China’s New Grand Strategy”, The Pacific Review 29, no. 
3 (2016): 461, doi:10.1080/09512748.2016.1154690.
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four economic objectives: expansion of Chinese construction 
companies, elevation of renminbi status as global reserve 
currency, obtaining energy security and creating demand for 
Chinese goods abroad.3 In terms of security, China certainly 
wants to achieve two objectives. First, speed up development 
of Central Asia, which could have stabilising effect on Xinji-
ang Uygur Autonomous Region. Second, establish overland 
trade routes, which could be used extensively during any 
potential military confrontation on the seas. In this narration 
infrastructure construction (railroads, sea ports, airports) in 
the Eurasia is advocated by China because of selfish interest, 
both economic and in terms of security. None can argue, that 
China is not trying to increase its value of export or broaden 
strategic options. However, there are at least three distinctive 
features of “One Belt, One Road” which prove the initiative 
to be far more important than a regular economic or secu-
rity policy. Firstly, the scope of the initiative is not limited to 
profiting China in term of economic gains. It gathers a few 
dozen of countries, which voluntarily agreed to cooperate. 
It would be unusual for other countries to participate in ac-
tivities, which are in contrary to their own interest. Addition-
ally, collaboration goes beyond economics. It also includes 
internal security, science, cultural exchange and more. Sec-
ondly, the initiative is supported by numerous institutions, 
both recently established and with a long history of financ-
ing different projects. Among them are Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), various international development 
banks and Chinese Silk Road Fund. Thirdly, development of 
3 Simeon Djankov, “The Rationale Behind China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative”, in China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Motives, Scope and 
Challenges, ed. Simeon Djankov and Sean Miner (Washington, DC: Pe-
terson Institute for International Economics, 2016), 7.
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“One Belt, One Road” became theme of many international 
summits and conferences, most notably Belt and Road Forum 
of International Cooperation in May 2017. Active engagement 
of politicians, media and scholars in discussion related to this 
concept position OBOR as a prospective framework for in-
ternational relations. That means China, for the first time in 
history, has an opportunity to establish the new paradigm 
for perceiving global affairs. Consequently, “One Belt, One 
Road” may be considered the beginning of China acting not 
as a benefiter of the global system, but as an architect of new 
global norms.
Scope of the initiative
From the beginning, both The Silk Road Economic Belt and 
The 21st-century Maritime Silk Road were equally empha-
sised by China. They were announced in September 2013 
(The Economic Belt) in Astana and in October the same year 
(the Maritime Silk Road) in Jakarta by president Xi Jinping. 
Presentation during visit abroad and in those two particular 
countries set the tone for the initiative. However, OBOR, and 
in particular Silk Road Economic Belt, is not a new idea. 
According to Tim Summers, it origins can be traced from 
regional development plans implemented in China since 
the 1980s.4 Even though Chinese central leadership have 
put special emphasis on development of coastal regions, the 
provincial authorities in borderland tried to establish ties 
with neighbouring countries. The construction of first rail-
way linking Xinjiang and Central Asia started in 1984, at the 
4 Tim Summers, “China’s ‘New Silk Roads: Sub-National Regions 
and Networks of Global Political Economy,” Third World Quarterly 37, 
no. 9 (2016): 1633, doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1153415.
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beginning of Sino-Soviet rapprochement, and was finished 
in 1990. Later the project was named “new Eurasian land 
bridge” and spanned from Jiangsu province in east China
to Netherlands.5 In the end, it was not a very successful en-
terprise, but the idea prevailed. Similarly, Maritime Silk Road 
was in use long before 2013. Although, it was much more 
important trade route for China than the land bridge.
Nevertheless, with involvement of central leadership, in 
particular Xi Jinping, the initiative became cornerstone of 
China’s engagement with the world. In October 2013, at in-
ternal “work forum on diplomacy to China’s periphery” Xi 
stressed usefulness of regional economic cooperation to de-
velopment.6 At the beginning concept focused exclusively on 
neighbouring countries, but it expanded rapidly toward oth-
er parts of the world. In March 2015 Chinese authorities re-
leased document “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk 
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”. 
As it stated:
The Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing to-
gether China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Bal-
tic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Medi-
terranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and 
connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and 
the Indian Ocean. The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road 
is designed to go from China’s coast to Europe through 
the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, 
5 John W. Garver, “Development of China’s Overland Transporta-
tion Links with Central, South-West and South Asia”, The China Quar-
terly 185, no. 2 (2006): 2–3, doi:10.1017/S0305741006000026.
6 Jinghan Zeng, “Does Europe Matter? The Role of Europe in Chi-
nese Narratives of ‘One Belt One Road’ and ‘New Type of Great Power 
Relations”, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 55, no. 5 (Sep-
tember 2017): 1170, doi:10.1111/jcms.12535.
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and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to 
the South Pacific in the other.7
It clearly states three routes of Silk Road Economic Belt. 
First, from China to Europe (or more specific “the Baltic” 
region). Second, from China to South-Western Asia. Third, 
from China to other regions of Asia. It also provides two 
routes of Maritime Silk Road – to the West (Indian Ocean) 
and East (Southern Pacific). This geographical expansions 
shifted perception of OBOR from Chinese peripheral policy 
to more mature, international concept. Along the routes are 
located six economic corridors: new Eurasian land bridge 
(the one which history can be tracked up to 1980s), China-
Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia, China-Indo-
china Peninsula, The China-Pakistan, and Bangladesh-Chi-
na-India-Myanmar. 
Next important document regarding development of OBOR, 
“Building the Belt and Road: Concept, Practice and China’s 
Contribution” was released in 2017. It was presented in May, 
a few days before Belt and Road Forum of International Co-
operation in Beijing. As of 2017, it is the most comprehensive 
outline of Chinese vision for OBOR. The document directly 
states existence of five trade routes and six economic corri-
dors (mentioned above), however it also indicates inclusive-
ness of initiative as open to countries “around the world”.8 It 
also enumerate six means of communication: railroads, high-
ways, sea transportation, aviation, pipelines, and aerospace.
7 “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic 
Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” 2015, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/
newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html, accessed August 29, 2017.
8 Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative, 
Building the Belt and Road: Concept, Practice and China’s Contribu-
tion (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2017), 4, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.
cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylyw/201705/201705110537027.pdf.
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Both documents present many areas of possible economic 
cooperation. Among them, for instance, are: improving con-
nectivity infrastructure (transport, energy, communication), 
developing customs coordination (recognition of regulations, 
law enforcement, better inspection and quarantine, certifica-
tion and statistical information), expanding trade, promoting 
new industries, and financial integration. Although econom-
ic-related policies dominate in a paper, there is also a lot of 
space dedicated to other means of cooperation. Cultural and 
academic exchanges, media cooperation, production and 
translations of movies, joint applications for Word Cultural 
Heritage sites, tourism, sharing information on epidemics 
and other public health issues, cooperation in research and 
development, entrepreneurship training, exchanges of leg-
islative bodies, think-tanks collaboration, and so on, and so 
forth. In “Building the Belt and Road: Concept, Practice and 
China’s Contribution” major development was adding envi-
ronmental protection to the scope of initiative. Even though 
economic matters dominate in OBOR, none can underesti-
mate impact of cultural exchange. After all, one of the im-
material products that travelled along ancient Silk Road from 
India to China was Buddhism.9 Nowadays it is a part of Chi-
nese intangible cultural heritage.
The last10 major document released by Chinese authorities 
is “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road 
Initiative” in June 2017. As the title suggest, it focuses on the 
development of The 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. Apart 
from two previously established maritime routes (in this doc-
ument called “blue economic passages”) to the Indian Ocean 
9 Ravi Bhoothalingam, “The Silk Road as a Global Brand”, ASCI 
Journal of Management 44, no. 2 (2015): 61, doi:10.1177/0009445515613869.
10 As for submission of text, i.e. August 2017. 
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and to the Southern Pacific, it proposes another one – to the 
Europe via Arctic Ocean. It is an inclusion of another old 
concept, known as Northeast Passage, into OBOR. Besides 
geographic expansion, this document proposes new areas of 
policy cooperation, for instance to monitor coastal and ocean 
blue carbon ecosystems.11
The importance of those two documents released in 2017 
may be deducted not only from the content but also from 
effort to make them available to the broad audience. Both 
of them have been released concurrently in seven different 
languages – all of the United Nation official languages and 
German. This is clear indication that Beijing is aiming to 
spread its ideas on international cooperation to as many gov-
ernments as possible. 
Apart from comprehensive papers describing OBOR, there 
are numerous other documents related to initiative. From 
more specific official documents (e.g. “Guiding Principles on 
Financing the Development of the Belt and Road”, “The Belt 
and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan”), 
through local plans (e.g. “Five-year (2016-2020) Action Plan 
for Chengdu to Integrate with the Belt and Road Initiative”) 
to bilateral documents with other governments (e.g. “Memo-
randum of Arrangement On Strengthening Cooperation on 
the Belt and Road Initiative Between The Government of the 
People’s Republic of China And The Government of New 
Zealand”).12 During Belt and Road Forum alone, China has 
11 National Development and Reform Commission and State Oce-
anic Administration, “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt 
and Road Initiative” (Beijing, 2017), 5, https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/
wcm.files/upload/CMSydylgw/201706/201706200153032.pdf.
12 “Belt and Road Portal”, 2017, https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iL-
ist.jsp?cat_id=10059, accessed August 29, 2017.
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signed with dozens of countries, or unilaterally released, 
76 types of different documents, spanning from MoU regard-
ing tourism to nuclear energy.13 Through this network of 
agreements, Beijing is legitimizing OBOR as credible frame-
work of international cooperation.
Since 2013 scope of the initiative is clearly expanding – in 
terms of geographical and policy diversity. It started as a 
concept of peripheral diplomacy and economic development 
tool, but quickly spread toward other areas. Most of the ide-
as are not particularly new, yet they are appealing to many 
countries. OBOR already attracted a few dozens of govern-
ments, and will almost certainly attract many more in future. 
First Belt and Road Forum was attended by representatives 
of 57 states, among them presidents of Argentina and Chile, 
prime minister of Fiji and members of cabinet from Austral-
ia, Brazil and New Zealand.14 There is a strong possibility the 
next comprehensive document on OBOR will acknowledge 
some Latin America countries as part of it. Additionally, the 
range of policies covered by the initiative is likely to broaden 
as well. Taken together, these direction suggest that the role 
of promoting economic ties with Europe will, with time, di-
minish within OBOR framework.
13 “List of Deliverables of Belt and Road Forum”, Xinhua, 2017, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/15/c_136286376.htm, ac-
cessed August 29, 2017.
14 “Belt and Road Attendees List,” The Diplomat, 2017, http://
thediplomat.com/2017/05/belt-and-road-attendees-list/, accessed Au-
gust 29, 2017.
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Institutional Ecosystem
Development of OBOR requires financial support for the 
specific project. After all, programs related to infrastructure 
construction are very capital-intensive. The idea of establish-
ing a new international development bank, Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank, was announced by Xi Jinping during 
the same state visit to Indonesia, on which he proposed The 
21st-century Maritime Silk Road. As Xi stated in Indonesian 
parliament: 
China is committed to greater connectivity with ASEAN 
countries. China will propose the establishment of an 
Asian infrastructure investment bank that would give 
priority to ASEAN countries’ needs.15
At the beginning, plans for AIIB was limited, and focused 
mostly on building connections between China and mem-
bers of Association of South-East Asian Nations. The need 
for this financial institution simply came from a clear ur-
gency in Asia for construction of new infrastructure16. How-
ever, with the help of Chinese diplomacy, the idea got at-
tention among many countries in Asia, Africa Europe and 
even South America. The Bank officially started on 25th of 
December, 2015 with 57 founding members, 22 out of them 
were non-regional states: Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, 
15 Wu Jiao, “President Xi Gives Speech to Indonesia’s Parliament”, 
China Daily, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xiapec/ 
2013-10/02/content_17007915.htm, accessed August 29, 2017.
16 Min Ye, “China and Competing Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: TPP, 
RCEP, and the New Silk Road,” Asian Security 11, no. 3 (2015): 221, doi
:10.1080/14799855.2015.1109509.
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Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. In 2017 Bank’s 
Board of Governors approved more than 20 new members. 
As for August 2017, 34 out of 80 members and prospective 
members are non-regional17. New members are shifting 
Bank’s focus from investments in China’s neighbourhood to 
more distant locations.
Despite the fact that AIIB is a separate entity from OBOR, 
it is likely to finance many projects under the initiative. 
Shared membership and goals (most noticeably: enhancing 
connectivity) position AIIB as the perfect tool for stimulating 
the development of OBOR. It is possible that other interna-
tional development banks will follow this example. During 
the Belt and Road Forum Chinese Ministry of Finance signed 
the memoranda of understanding on “collaboration on mat-
ters of common interest” under the Belt and Road Initiative 
with the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, the European Investment Bank, the New 
Development Bank (the “BRICS Bank”) and the World Bank 
Group. At the opening plenary session of Forum, president of 
the last mentioned institution have finished his speech with 
a statement: “We’re ready to help make the promise of the 
Belt and Road Initiative a reality”.18 This indicates a possible 
extension of World Bank involvement into OBOR. However, 
17 Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, “Members and Pro-
spective Members of the Bank”, 2017, https://www.aiib.org/en/about-ai-
ib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html, accessed August 29, 2017.
18 Jim Yong Kim, “Remarks of World Bank Group President Jim 
Yong Kim at the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation – 
Opening Plenary Session,” 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
speech/2017/05/14/remarks-of-world-bank-group-president-jim-yong-
kim, accessed August 29, 2017.
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it is important to bear in mind that cooperation does not 
require formal accession to the initiative. The same circum-
stances apply to other development banks.
The sole financial institution directly associated with 
OBOR is Silk Road Fund. It is Chinese state owned invest-
ment fund established in order to stimulate investments in 
countries within the Initiative. It started operating in Decem-
ber of 2014, with an initial capital of 40 billion USD. The first 
project funded by Silk Road Fund was 1,65 billion USD Kar-
ot hydropower in Pakistan.19 During Belt and Road Forum 
China announced the addition of another 14,5 billion USD to 
the Fund.20 Currently, it is the biggest financial instrument in 
the OBOR controlled by the single government.
Involvement of international developmental institution 
into the initiative provides additional opportunities for China 
to strengthen the engagement of different partners. As OBOR 
is expanding geographically, it is almost certain that more 
and more projects labelled under the initiative will be funded 
by them. It is another factor which legitimize OBOR. 
Multilateral cooperation and diplomacy
Evolution of OBOR as a framework for international relations 
requires not only plentiful documents and financial mecha-
nisms, but also meaningful political dialog. China is prob-
ably one of the most prominent supporters of multilateral 
19 “China’s Silk Road Fund Makes First Investment in Pakistan’s 
Hydropower Project”, Xinhua, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ 
2015-04/21/c_134167533.htm, accessed August 29, 2017.
20 Hou Qiang, “China Boosts Silk Road Fund’s Capital to Meet Enor-
mous Funding Demand: Official”, Xinhua, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282715.htm, accessed August 29, 2017.
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diplomacy in the world, therefore unsurprisingly it organized 
first Belt and Road Forum on International Cooperation, at-
tended by dozens of representatives of governments and in-
ternational institutions. Though, it took Beijing almost three 
and half years to organize the summit. The next meeting is 
planned in 2019. 
Additionally, there is a broad spectrum of more specific 
conferences within OBOR. For instance OBOR Security Co-
operation Dialogue, which was held on 4-5 of May 2017, with 
an aim to foster mechanism of cooperation on internal and 
external security. This event was attended by representatives 
of more than 20 governments.21 Some of the meetings are not 
necessarily designed as purely political, as they encompass 
different aspects of cooperation under OBOR. One of the ex-
amples is Digital Belt and Road Initiative Meeting held on 6-7 
of December, 2016. The event brought nearly 100 experts 
and scholars from China and several other countries. Digital 
Belt and Road Initiative is science program, which aspira-
tion is to use space-based observation to provide information 
helpful in sustainable development within OBOR.22
Similar to use of long-established trade routes, OBOR also 
spreads to different forms of multilateral cooperation. One 
of the best examples exists within international collabora-
tion in tourism. In 1993, at United Nation’s World Tourism 
Organization (UNWTO) General Assembly, the idea of Silk 
Road tourism project was raised. It was designed as tool for 
21 Xiang Bo, “Beijing Holds Security Cooperation Dialogue on 
Belt and Road Initiative”, Xinhua, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2017-05/04/c_136257488.htm, accessed August 29, 2017.
22 “Digital Belt and Road Initiative Meeting Held in Beijing,” 
Institute for Remote Sensing and Digital Earth. Chinese Acad-
emy of Sciences, 2016, http://english.radi.cas.cn/News/NU/201612/
t20161221_172699.html, accessed August 29, 2017.
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promotion tourism in the countries of ancient Silk Road. 
Since then, the little know idea was slowly developing. In 
2015, during the 7th UNWTO International Meeting on Silk 
Road Tourism, first Tourism Ministerial Meeting of Countries 
along the Silk Road Economic Belt was organized. It was at-
tended by representatives of over 25 states, which have an 
opportunity to discuss further cooperation in tourism – this 
time under OBOR framework.23
With the further evolution of OBOR, there is a strong 
possibility of adaptation of other international cooperation 
mechanisms under the initiative. Additionally, it is likely that 
China will promote OBOR issues during regional forums 
which it initiated: Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FO-
CAC), China-Central and East Europe Countries Meetings 
(“16+1” cooperation), Forum of China and Community of 
Latin American and Caribbean States (China-CELAC Forum), 
Arab-China Cooperation Forum and Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization.
China will try to bring as many multilateral fora as pos-
sible under the initiative. Engaging the international com-
munity into multilateral cooperation and diplomacy may be 
one of the most effective tools to legitimize OBOR as a frame-
work for international relations. Meaningful dialog about the 
current and future shape of OBOR among involved countries 
is vital to maintaining its interest into the initiative.
23 “7th UNWTO International Meeting on Silk Road Tourism and 
1st Tourism Ministerial Meeting on the Silk Road Economic Belt”, UN-
WTO Silk Road Programme, 2015, http://silkroad.unwto.org/event/7th-
unwto-international-meeting-silk-road-tourism-and-1st-tourism-minis-
terial-meeting-silk-roa, accessed August 29, 2017.
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 Concluding Remarks
During the official speech at Belt and Road Forum in Beijing 
Xi Jinping said:
We have enhanced coordination with the policy initia-
tives of relevant countries, such as the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union of Russia, the Master Plan on ASEAN 
Connectivity, the Bright Road initiative of Kazakhstan, 
the Middle Corridor initiative of Turkey, the Develop-
ment Road initiative of Mongolia, the Two Corridors, 
One Economic Circle initiative of Viet Nam, the North-
ern Powerhouse initiative of the UK and the Amber 
Road initiative of Poland. We are also promoting com-
plementarity between China’s development plan and 
those of Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Hungary and other 
countries.24
This may be the most accurate description of OBOR aim. 
The results of this investigation show that OBOR is a com-
prehensive, inclusive initiative, which cannot be dismissed 
simply as Chinse strategy for expanding trade or preserving 
security. Furthermore, the scope of the initiative is growing 
rapidly. Therefore, this study has identified three conclu-
sions.
Firstly, OBOR is becoming an umbrella term for differ-
ent regional development strategies across Eurasia, Africa 
and perhaps beyond. Those strategies include many aspects, 
ranging from economy, through security to science and en-
vironmental protection. Some features of the initiative are 
developing better, others still lack of meaningful action. 
24 Xi Jinping, “Full Text of President Xi’s Speech at Opening of 
Belt and Road Forum”, Xinhua, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm, accessed August 29, 2017.
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However, the increasing number of countries and policies 
included into OBOR shows attractiveness of it. “One Belt, 
One Road” (or “Belt and Road Initiative”) is already outdated 
term, which easily could be changed into “Belts and Roads”. 
In near future, with expansion to Latin American countries, 
the Initiative may even evolve into “Global Silk Road”.
Secondly, “One Belt, One Road” became cognitive frame-
work, a paradigm, for international relations –the way that 
people perceive them. There are numerous conferences, 
meetings and programs under OBOR. Social scientists, jour-
nalists and other representatives of public opinion allocate 
a lot of time to discuss them. That legitimize the initiative 
and add importance to it. One possible implication of this 
is that idea of categorizing involved countries into one en-
tity is credible. At the end, the countries in the world may 
be divided into two categories – those who participate in 
OBOR and those, who are reluctant to integrate with the 
block. Using different terms: those which actively participate 
in globalization, and those which want to slow down this 
process. It will not be Cold War style rivalry, although it 
may bring some tensions, most likely between United States 
(which is not positively predisposed towards the initiative) 
and its partners. Some even hold the view, that OBOR may 
challenge current order in Eurasia.25
Thirdly, introduction of „One Belt, One Road” may be the 
beginning of China in role of architect of new global institu-
tions and rules. Since 1978 China was benefiting from the 
structure of international relations. With rapid economic 
development, the influence of Beijing raised. However, until 
25 David Arase, “China’s Two Silk Roads Initiative What It Means 
for Southeast Asia,” Southeast Asian Affaris, no. 1 (2015): 42, muse.jhu.
edu/article/583040.
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recently China mostly concentrated attention on collection 
information regarding international norms and exploiting it. 
Nowadays, it taken more active attitude, by proposing poli-
cies, regulations and new mechanisms of cooperation. Marc 
Lanteigne hold the view that China made transition from 
“system-influencing” toward more “system-determining” 
state.26 OBOR is the prime example of this progression. Bei-
jing’s involvement into global governance will almost cer-
tainly become more common in the future.
Confident and active foreign policy has become a feature 
distinguishing Xi Jinping administration from his predeces-
sors.27 Development of OBOR will constitute major part of it. 
As far as China is willing to include other countries advices 
on the evolution of the initiative and tries to international-
ize the concept, OBOR has a chance to become new frame-
work for international relations. The reason for that is even 
though the concept is imperfect, at least it presents a vision 
of development. None of other major powers tries to do that. 
Nonetheless, if China unilaterally decide to selfishly exploit 
established mechanism of cooperation, the initiative will lose 
its attractiveness. Ultimately, there may be also a dilemma of 
overextension of OBOR. It may become more troublesome 
to achieve consensus among growing number of countries 
regarding growing number of policies. After all, Jack of all 
trades is a master of none. More research is needed to better 
understand impact of this particular matter on future of the 
initiative.
26 Marc Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction (New 
York: Routledge, 2016), 74.
27 Jian Zhang, “China’s New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: To-
wards ‘Peaceful Rise 2.0’?” Global Change, Peace & Security 27, no. 1 
(2015): 6, doi:10.1080/14781158.2015.993958.
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